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Contract Law – Specific Performance for Real Property 
Summary 
 
 This case is a consolidated appeal from district court judgments granting specific 
performance and awarding costs in a real property action. 
 
Disposition/Outcome 
 
 Affirmed.  Judgment in favor of Appellee Ray Koroghli (“Koroghli”) granting specific 
performance because Appellants Seaynoah Mayfield and Helen Mayfield (“Mayfields”) were not 
excused from performing under the contract for the sale of real property and Koroghli showed 
that he was ready, willing, and able to perform.  However, the award of costs to Koroghli is 
reversed because the district court abused its discretion by failing to attempt to apportion costs 
incurred while litigating against the Mayfields from those costs incurred while litigating against 
Ellen Ross (“Ross”).1  Accordingly, the matter is remanded to the district court for it to consider 
apportionment of any costs awarded to Koroghli consistent with the rule adopted in the opinion. 
 
Factual and Procedural History 
 
 In 1999, the Mayfields entered into a contract with Satsoy Thay (“Thay”) for the sale of 
land in Henderson, NV.  Thay assigned the contract to Koroghli who hired real estate agent Ross 
to make on offer on the property to the Mayfields and represent his interests in the transaction.  
The first contract expired and the parties entered into a second contract on January 5, 2000.  The 
second contract provided for the close of escrow 60 days from the date that Koroghli obtained 
commercial rezoning and subdivision of the property.  The contract did not contain a date by 
which performance must occur, nor did it contain a clause declaring time of the essence. 
 
 Due to efforts by the Mayfields and Koroghli, the Henderson City Council rezoned the 
property on September 5, 2000 but did not approve it for commercial subdivision.  In early 2001, 
Koroghli offered to waive the commercial subdivision condition and close on the property.  The 
Mayfields declined the offer and committed to assisting in obtaining all the original goals of the 
contract.   The parties continued to pursue approval for commercial subdivision to no avail.  On 
February 26, 2003, the Mayfields repudiated the contract and refused to sell the property to 
Koroghli.  The Mayfields did not provide Koroghli with prior notice or reason.  Koroghli 
responded by sending the Mayfields a letter indicating he was “ready, willing, and able” to 
perform, and demanding the close of escrow. 
 
 Koroghli filed suit against the Mayfields seeking specific performance and against Ross 
alleging breach of contract and breach of fiduciary duty.  The Mayfields asserted cross-claims 
against Ross.  Koroghli and the Mayfields settled out-of-court with Ross and she was dismissed 
from the case.  The district court held that the Mayfields breached the contract and that Koroghli 
                                                 
1 Both Koroghli and the Mayfields settled out of court with Ellen Ross and she was dismissed from the case.  
was entitled to specific performance.  The Mayfields had the duty to fix a reasonable time for 
performance on the commercial subdivision clause and notify Koroghli of that time before 
declaring default.  The Mayfields had that duty because the contract did not contain a date by 
which Koroghli had to obtain approval for commercial subdivision or a clause making time of 
the essence.  The Court awarded specific performance of the contract to Koroghli and awarded 
costs in the amount of $52,690.91. 
 
Discussion 
 
A. Specific Performance of Contract for Sale of Real Property 
 
 The Mayfields argued on appeal that the grant of specific performance was improper for 
two reasons.  First, The Mayfields asserted that they were not required to make a demand on 
Koroghli to perform by a certain date.  Second, the Mayfields argued that Koroghli did not and 
was unable to perform according to the terms of the contract.  The Supreme Court reviewed the 
district court’s decision for an abuse of discretion. 
 
1. Time not of the Essence for Performance of the Contract 
 
 The Mayfields argued that a demand for performance is not necessary unless it is 
required by the terms or nature of the contract and that, even if a demand is required, an 
exception exists when it is apparent that a demand would be unavailing or constitute a useless 
formality.  Specifically, the Mayfields argue that such a demand would have been futile because 
if Koroghli intended to perform, he would have done so prior to the repudiation of the contract. 
 
 The Court began its analysis by stating the law on time for performance of contracts.  
Time for performance under a contract is not considered of the essence unless the contract 
expressly so provides or the circumstances of the contract so imply.2  Parties generally must 
perform under a contract within a reasonable time if time is not of the essence.3  Whether time is 
of the essence depends upon the nature of the contract and the particular circumstances 
involved.4  In the absence of a clause making time of the essence, a party’s failure to perform 
within a reasonable time generally does not constitute a material breach of the agreement.5  In 
the absence of a clause in the contract, a party may make it so by demanding performance by a 
certain date or time as long as the party fixes a reasonable time for the completion of the contract 
and gives notice to the other party of an intention to abandon the contract unless it is completed 
within the specified time.6  By making such a demand, the time for a party’s performance 
becomes a material term of the contract and failure to perform by the time specified usually 
constitutes and has the legal effect of a material breach.7 
 
                                                 
2 See 15 Richard A Lord, Williston on Contracts § 46:3, at 399-404 (4th ed. 2000).  
3 Stratton v. Tejani, 187 Cal. Rptr. 231, 235 (Ct. App. 1982). 
4 Mohr Park Manor, Inc. v. Bank of Nevada, 87 Nev. 520, 522, 490 P.2d 217, 218 (1971). 
5 See Zancanaro v. Cross, 339 P.2d 746, 749 (Ariz. 1959); Deep Nines, Inc. v. McAfee, Inc., 246 S.W.3d 842, 846 
(Tex. App. 2008). 
6 See 15 Richard A Lord, Williston on Contracts § 46:16, at 484-85 (4th ed. 2000). 
7 See O’Malley v. Cummings, 229 N.E.2d 878, 880-81 (Ill. App. Ct. 1967); New Colony Homes v. Long Island 
Property, 803 N.Y.S.2d 615, 616 (App. Div. 2005). 
 The Court proceeded to analyze the contract between the Mayfields and Koroghli 
according to the established law.  The Court noted that the contract did not expressly make time 
of the essence and the circumstances did not indicate that the parties intended completion of 
performance by a certain date to be an essential part of the bargain.  The Court also noted that the 
parties worked together over a period of years with the goal of meeting the condition precedent 
and that the Mayfields rejected Koroghli’s offer to waive the condition precedent.  The Court 
held that time was not of the essence in their contract based on the terms of the contract and the 
parties’ behavior and representations. 
 
 Next, the Court ruled that a demand for performance by a certain time would not have 
been a futile demand because Koroghli did not repudiate the contract or indicate that he did not 
intend to perform under it.  Therefore, if the Mayfields had made a demand for performance 
within a reasonable amount of time, they would have been able to repudiate the contract if 
Koroghli failed to perform by the set date.  The Court held that time was not of the essence in 
their contract with Koroghli because the Mayfields did not demand performance and they were 
not excused from that obligation by futility. 
 
2. Reasonable Time for Performance of the Contract 
 
 The Mayfields argued that three years exceeds a reasonable time for performance of the 
contract and since Koroghli did not perform, their repudiation was warranted.  The Court held 
that a reasonable time for performance has not yet expired even though the district court did not 
make express findings on the subject.  Both parties had extensive knowledge of land transactions 
of this type and they worked together in order to obtain the necessary permits and approvals for 
commercial subdivision.  The Court held that under the circumstances of the case, the passage of 
three years after the formation of the contract did not exceed a reasonable time for performance.  
Therefore, the Mayfields repudiation was not appropriate and was a breach of contract. 
 
3. Tender of Performance by Koroghli 
 
 The Mayfields argued that the district court erred in granting specific performance 
because did not tender specific performance.  The Mayfields asserted that Koroghli could not 
tender performance according to the terms of the contract because the commercial subdivision 
condition had not been fulfilled at the time of repudiation.  Nevada law states that a party seeking 
specific performance must have tendered performance according to the terms of the contract 
before a grant of specific performance is appropriate.8  However, if a purchaser of real property 
has not yet tendered the purchase price, a grant of specific performance is still appropriate if the 
purchaser can demonstrate that he is “ready, willing, and able to perform.”9 
 
 The Court noted that it is undisputed that Koroghli offered to close escrow without the 
condition being met and tender the purchase price to close the deal.  The Court held that 
Koroghli adequately demonstrated that he was ready, willing, and able to perform.  In rebuttal to 
that assertion, the Mayfields argued that Koroghli’s offer of tender of performance was deficient 
                                                 
8 Serpa v. Darling, 107 Nev. 299, 305, 810 P.2d 778, 782 (1991). 
9 Id. at 304, 810 P.2d at 782. 
because the commercial subdivision precedent was never met.  In addition, the Mayfields 
asserted that Koroghli could not unilaterally waive the condition because it was for the benefit of 
both parties. 
 
 The Court proceeded to review the law on unilateral waiver of a condition in a contract.  
A party may unilaterally waive a condition in a contract if the condition was included in the 
contract for his or her benefit.10  Whether a particular condition is for the benefit of one or both 
parties is a question fact.11  This determination depends of the facts and circumstances of the 
particular case as well as the language of the contract at issue.12  The test is whether the 
condition was intended by both parties to be included in the contract for the benefit of both 
parties, not whether the condition was in fact of a benefit to both parties.13 
 
 The Court examined the history of the commercial subdivision clause and found that the 
clause was included at Koroghli’s request to ensure that the property could be used in the manner 
expected by him.  The Court held that the district court did not err by finding that the commercial 
subdivision clause was included in the contract for Koroghli’s benefit.  It is irrelevant to that 
determination that the clause may have benefitted the Mayfields in the future.  Based on this 
analysis, the Court held that Koroghli could unilaterally waive the commercial subdivision 
clause.  The offer to waive the condition and tender the purchase price at the time of the 
Mayfields repudiation was satisfactory proof that he was ready, willing, and able to perform.  
The district court’s grant of specific performance was appropriate. 
 
B. Apportionment of Litigation Costs 
 
 The Mayfields dispute the district court’s award to Koroghli of costs incurred by 
litigation because a portion of those costs were incurred during litigation against Ross.  The 
Mayfields claimed that the award of costs should be reduced by half.  Koroghli argued that the 
apportionment of costs was impractical and not required when claims pursued against multiple 
parties are substantially intertwined.  He asserted that the claims against the Mayfields and Ross 
were substantially intertwined. 
 
 The issue of the propriety of apportioning costs when the prevailing party pursued similar 
claims, based on the same factual circumstances, against multiple defendants is a question of first 
impression in the state of Nevada.  The Court followed the California Court of Appeals in its 
determination that apportionment is not mandatory in such an instance, as the district court could 
reasonably have concluded that the claims were so “inextricably intertwined” as to make it 
“impracticable, if not impossible, to separate the multitude of conjoined activities into 
compensable or noncompensable time units.”14   
 
                                                 
10 Silver Dollar Clubv. Cosgriff Neon, 107 Nev 299, 305, 810 P.2d 778, 782 (1991). 
11 See Pelligreen v. Wood, 111 S.W.3d 446, 451 (Mo. Ct. App. 2003); Crescenta Valley Moose Lodge No. 808 v. 
Bunt, 87 Cal. Rptr. 428, 431 (Ct. App. 1970). 
12 Pelligreen, 111 S.W.3d at 451. 
13 Id. 
14 Abdallah v. United Saving Bank, 51 Cal. Rptr. 2d 286, 293 (Ct. App. 1996). 
 The Court adopted the reasoning in the Abdullah court’s reasoning and held that, in an 
action in which a plaintiff pursues claims based on the same factual circumstances against 
multiple defendants, it is within the district court’s discretion to determine whether 
apportionment is rendered impracticable by the interrelationship of the claims against the 
multiple defendants.  The district court must, however, attempt to apportion the costs before 
determining that apportionment is impracticable.  When attempting to apportion costs, the 
district court must make specific findings, either on the record during oral proceeding or in its 
order, with regard to the circumstances of the case before it that render apportionment 
impracticable. 
 
 The Court found that the district court ruled that Koroghli’s claims against the Mayfields 
and Ross were so intertwined that apportionment was impracticable.  However, the district court 
did not attempt to apportion the litigation costs before making its ruling awarding Koroghli costs.  
The Court reversed the award of costs to Koroghli and remanded this matter to the district court 
for it to consider the practicability of apportioning costs. 
 
Conclusion 
 The Court affirmed the grant of specific performance to Koroghli for the contract for the 
sale of real property with the Mayfields.  The Mayfields did not have the right to repudiate the 
contract without a demand for performance or a clause making time of the essence.  
Furthermore, Koroghli was able to waive the condition precedent because it was included in the 
contract for his benefit.  Lastly, the Court adopted new rules governing the apportionment of 
costs when the prevailing party pursued similar claims, based on the same factual circumstances, 
against multiple defendants.  The Court reversed and remanded the matter of costs for the district 
court to consider the practicability of apportioning costs. 
